Check out the 2019 edition of the CMTL Rosh HaShanah Reader for Divrei Torah from Rabbi Klapper and CMTL alumni!
Wishing you all a Ketivah VeChatimah Tovah!
Check out the 2019 edition of the CMTL Rosh HaShanah Reader for Divrei Torah from Rabbi Klapper and CMTL alumni!
Wishing you all a Ketivah VeChatimah Tovah!
by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper
The phrase l’ahavah et Hashem Elokekha appears in Devarim 30:16, and then again in Devarim 30:20. These verses are the bookends of a parshah, or stanza, so the redundancy appears blatant. But the prefix lamed of l’ahavah may turn out to be a homonym, or even a pun, so that the stanza actually conveys a dramatic spiritual development. Properly understanding that development may be a sine qua non for fulfilling the imperative, found in verse 19, to “choose life.”
Verse 15 opens with G-d declaring that He has placed before us this day
the life and the good
and the death and the bad
Verse 16 opens with
אֲשֶׁ֨ר אָנֹכִ֣י מְצַוְּךָ֘ הַיּוֹם֒
that I am commanding you this day
Does G-d mean that He is commanding us both life and death, both good and bad? Presumably not. Therefore, the commandments must be what follows, with verse 16 only establishing a context. What follow is l’ahavah et Hashem Elokekha.
We can reasonably translate verses 15-16 as follows
נָתַ֤תִּי לְפָנֶ֙יךָ֙ הַיּ֔וֹם
אֲשֶׁ֨ר אָנֹכִ֣י מְצַוְּךָ֘ הַיּוֹם֒
לְאַהֲבָ֞ה אֶת־ה֤’ אֱ-לֹהֶ֙יךָ֙
לָלֶ֣כֶת בִּדְרָכָ֔יו וְלִשְׁמֹ֛ר מִצְוֹתָ֥יו וְחֻקֹּתָ֖יו וּמִשְׁפָּטָ֑יו
וּבֵֽרַכְךָ֙ ה֣’ אֱ-לֹהֶ֔יךָ בָּאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־אַתָּ֥ה בָא־שָׁ֖מָּה לְרִשְׁתָּֽהּ:
I have placed before you this day
the life and the good
and the death and the bad
(in) that I am commanding you this day to love Hashem your G-d –
to walk in His ways and to observe His mitzvot, His chukum, and His mishpatim –
and (if you observe them), you will live and multiply,
and Hashem your G-d will bless you
in the land to which you are coming there, to possess it.
L’ahavah here means “to love,” and to love G-d means to walk in His ways and observe His mitzvot, chukim, and mishpatim. There seems to be no obligation here to feel or inculcate the emotion of love toward G-d, but rather to express that emotion through proper action. It may even be enough to act as if one is feeling that emotion.
Remember that G-d placed before us both life and death, the good and the bad. He did that by commanding us to act in certain ways. Obeying His command brings life, multiplication and blessing; verses 17-18 make explicit that disobedience brings destruction and shortened life, or perhaps national exile. Connecting life to multiplication suggests that it has a straightforward physical meaning.
In verse 19, G-d calls Heaven and Earth to witness – and to be prepared to testify if necessary – that
הַחַיִּ֤ים וְהַמָּ֙וֶת֙ נָתַ֣תִּי לְפָנֶ֔יךָ
the life and death I have placed before you
the blessing and the curse
The introduction of witnesses may just be an intensification of G-d’s opening declaration. But the change from good/bad to blessing/curse opens the possibility that the meaning of “life” has also changed.
In verse 17, G-d commanded us to love Him, and life is the consequence of our obedience. In verse 19-20, the relationship between love and life seems much more complex and multivalent.
לְמַ֥עַן תִּחְיֶ֖ה אַתָּ֥ה וְזַרְעֶֽךָ:
לְאַֽהֲבָה֙ אֶת־ה֣’ א-ֱלֹהֶ֔יךָ
כִּ֣י ה֤וּא חַיֶּ֙יךָ֙ וְאֹ֣רֶךְ יָמֶ֔יךָ
לָשֶׁ֣בֶת עַל־ הָאֲדָמָ֗ה אֲשֶׁר֩ נִשְׁבַּ֨ע ה֧’ לַאֲבֹתֶ֛יךָ
לְאַבְרָהָ֛ם לְיִצְחָ֥ק וּֽלְיַעֲקֹ֖ב לָתֵ֥ת לָהֶֽם:
You must choose life
so that you will live, you and your seed,
l’ahavah et Hashem Elokekha
to heed His voice
and to cleave to Him
because that/He is your life and the length of your days
to settle on the ground that Hashem swore to your ancestors –
to Avraham, to Yitzchak, and to Yaakov –
to give them.
We are commanded to choose life; life is a motive for and a consequence of that choice; and that choice, or perhaps G-d the Commander, is our life. All this is confusing enough: but what’s love got to do with it?
In verse 17, love was reducible to observance; it was about external expression, not internal state. In verse 20, love leads to dveykus/cleaving, which is generally a metaphor for an internal state.
Dveykus the internal state is independent of love. For example, in Genesis 34:3 Shekhem’s nefesh cleaves to Dina after he rapes her, and then he loves her (in some sense). Men abandon their parents and cleave to their wives, while Ruth cleaves to her mother in-law after her husband dies; love is not mentioned explicitly in either context.
A beraita on Nedarim 62a offers an interpretation of verse 20.
לאהבה את ה’ א-להיך
לשמוע בקולו ולדבקה בו –
שלא יאמר אדם:
אקרא – שיקראוני חכם;
אשנה – שיקראוני רבי;
אשנן – שאהיה זקן ואשב בישיבה,
אלא – למד מאהבה, וסוף הכבוד לבא,
שנאמר: קשרם על אצבעותיך כתבם על לוח לבך,
ואומר: דרכיה דרכי נועם,
ואומר: עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה ותומכיה מאושר.
l’ahavah et Hashem Elokekha
to heed His voice and cleave to Him –
(meaning) that a person should not say:
I will read – so that they will call me the title Chakham;
I will recite – so that they will give me the title Rabbi;
I will teach (or sharpen) – so that I can be a zaken and sit in the academy.
Rather – learn out of love, and in the end the honor will come,
as Scripture says: Bind them on your fingers; write them on the tablet of your heart;
and it says: Her paths are paths of pleasantness;
and it says: She is a tree of life for those who grasp her, and those who support her are enriched.
The obvious shift from verses 15-16 is that love is expressed in study rather than in action. The subtler but equally crucial shift is that l’ahavah is translated as “out of love.” Verses 19-20 now say that we must choose life out of love of G-d. Love is an internal state, a motivation. Not only that: love – at least the kind of love that leads to dveykus – is an exclusive religious motivation. Learning out of love means learning with no other motive.
This creates a paradox. Love of G-d entails the belief or knowledge that He is just, which means that He will reward you for expressing love toward Him. The nature of a just reward is to be something you genuinely and properly desire. How, then, can human beings serve G-d without the reward becoming part of their motivation? But religious love is defined by its jealousy; it cannot coexist with other motives.
The beraita reflects this paradox. We are not supposed to learn for the sake of being honored, but if we are to learn out of love, if we are to find G-d worthy of love, we must believe that honor will come.
This paradox is at the heart of Sefer Iyov. G-d wants to know that Iyov serves Him out of love and not, as Satan asserts, out of self-interest. But He can only find that out by at least seeming unjust, and would Iyov love an unjust G-d? Should he?
The same dynamic drives Akeidat Yitzchak. G-d can only find out whether Avraham serves him purely out of love by demanding that he sacrifice Yitzchak. Very likely Avraham cannot serve G-d purely out of love so long as Yitzchak lives, because he cannot stop himself from considering Yitzchak’s interests when making decisions, even if he can disregard his own interests. But if Avraham actually sacrifices Yitzchak, he will cease loving G-d. There is a Heisenberg principle at work; G-d can be loved, or know that He is loved, but not both. When G-d places life and death before us, He reminds us of His power over us; and pure love generally cannot exist in awareness of power. But to love someone means giving them emotional power over you!
What may square the circle is perfect faith that He will never use that emotional power, never demand proofs of love that are not in our best interests. Perhaps that is dveykus.
by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper
Rabbinic law often seems radically more humane than the text of the Written Torah. This discrepancy leads some to conclude that the Rabbis of the Mishnah and Talmud consciously and deliberately overturned Biblical law when they found it morally disagreeable. This conclusion leads to a question/critique: Why don’t contemporary rabbis do the same thing?
In Part 1, I briefly discussed cases where (some) Rabbis explicitly declared that a Biblical law “never was and never will be,” and why no such statement appears regarding mamzerut. I wrote that nonetheless “Humane poskim can . . . aim to resolve every case of mamzerut, so long as they can do so with integrity.” In other words, it is possible and legitimate for a contemporary halakhist to aim for the laws of mamzerut to never apply in practice, even though factually many pregnancies result from adultery or incest.
How can this be done with integrity? In what way is this different than eliminating a Biblical law on the basis of our own morality?
Mamzerut actually seems to be a more extreme case of elimination than the Rebellious Son, Idolatrous City, or House with Tzora’at. It’s not just that the Rabbis didn’t formally eliminate mamzerut; they actually extended it to new cases. Most dramatically, the Biblical prohibition, as understood by the Rabbis (Kiddushin 73a), applies only to a mamzer vadai/definite, but the Rabbis extended it to cases of safek/doubt! Contemporary halakhists who seek to resolve every case of mamzerut therefore seem to be diverging from the Rabbis as well as from the Torah.
This extreme version of halakhic authority is disturbing for another reason. We might cheer poskim when they undo stringencies that cause pain, but by doing so, are we also granting them the authority to undo leniencies? If the Torah does not constrain rabbis from imposing their morality on halakhah, why should we have more confidence in their morality than in the Torah?
Let’s approach this issue through the specific lens of Igrot Moshe, the collected responsa of the great 20th century posek Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l. I want to concede upfront that the synthetic position I develop below is not explicit in Rav Moshe’s works, and some of the details are also derived or extrapolated. Nonetheless, I believe that it is a fair and accurate portrayal.
Mishnah Kiddushin Chapter 4 lists three groups of people with halakhic marriage-barriers that derive from safek rather than certainty: “shtuki, asufi, and kuti.” A shtuki is someone whose mother is known, but she refuses to name the father; an asufi is a foundling. (The kuti is unrelated to mamzerut issues.)
Rava (Kiddushin 73a) states that a shtuki and asufi are each Biblically permitted, but Rabbinically forbidden. Why would the Rabbis have created such a cruel prohibition? Since the Torah permits a safek mamzer, Rava reasons, the Rabbis cannot have been concerned for the minority possibility that these children are mamzerim. Rather, they must have been concerned that these children with unknown parents would contract an incestuous marriage, and thus give birth to mamzerim.
However, the Talmud (or Rava himself) rejects this explanation as far-fetched. It concludes instead that the reason must be מעלה עשו ביוחסים, literally “they created a higher standard in genealogical matters.”
This conclusion seems to abandon, without justification, the opening assumption that the Rabbis would not contradict the Torah’s decision not to be concerned for the minority possibility of mamzerut. How can this be?
Rav Moshe notes that the Talmud explicitly includes only the shtuki and the asufi in the new Rabbinic prohibition. Perhaps all other safek mamzers remain permitted! This possibility appeals to him, but it runs aground on Mishneh Torah, Laws of Sexual Prohibitions 15:21.
דין תורה שספק ממזר מותר לבוא בקהל
שנאמר לא יבא ממזר בקהל ה’ –
ממזר ודאי אסור לבוא בקהל, ולא ספק,
אבל חכמים עשו מעלה ביוחסין,
ואסרו גם הספיקות לבוא בקהל.
The law of the Torah is that a safek mamzer is permitted to marry into the Jewish community
because Scripture says: A mamzer must not enter the community of Hashem,
a definite mamzer is prohibited to enter the community, but not a safek.
But the Sages instituted a higher standard in genealogical matters,
and forbade even the safeks from entering the community.
This undisputed ruling of Maimonides makes it clear that the shtuki and asufi are only examples, and the Rabbis forbade all safek mamzers.
But, Rav Moshe notes, Maimonides also makes clear that the prohibition is the same for all safek mamzers. This means that the reason for the prohibition can never be a genuine concern that the child is a “biological” mamzer, but rather – as Maimonides states – that some form of higher standard is imposed here. But what is the difference between a “higher standard” and a “genuine concern?”
Igrot Moshe EH 1:11 has one answer to that question. A genuine concern, analogous to all other cases of safek, would apply for all halakhic matters. A “higher standard” would apply only to matters that affect a holiness status conferred by genealogy. It therefore does not apply to the marriage prohibitions for biological kohanim that do not have the holiness status of kohanim, such as a petzua daka.
EH 1:24 points toward a different answer. Please bear with the unavoidable technicalities, and the necessarily clinical discussion of a tragic case of rape.
Mishnah Ketubot 1:10 reports that an unmarried young woman was raped when she went to draw water from her city’s well, and subsequently gave birth to a daughter. Talmud Ketubot 15a asks: Is the daughter eligible to marry a kohen? That depends on whether the rapist/presumed father was a man whose daughters are eligible (i.e. not a mamzer or netin or chalal), or not. The Talmud concludes that the daughter is eligible (according to the positions that matter for our discussion) if
The need for the presence of a caravan, and for the majority of the caravan to be eligible, is that a “higher standard” was implemented for genealogical matters – we require “two majorities,” not just one. Since a majority of the potential “city fathers” were eligible, and also a majority of the “caravan fathers,” this higher standard is met.
The obvious problem is that this “higher standard” does not affect the statistical likelihood of the daughter’s eligibility. If 90% of the men in the city were eligible, and 60% of the men in the caravan, then including the caravan makes things worse statistically than if there were no caravan! Regardless, the actual likelihood is a single percentage, drawn from the overall population of potential fathers/rapists. So in what sense is this “two majorities?”
It must be that the “higher standard” for marrying a kohen is not statistical, but rather formal. Rav Moshe contends that this is the nature of “higher standards.” It follows that in mamzerut cases as well, on a statistical basis one needs only to demonstrate that the person is a safek. This removes the Biblical prohibition, and leaves one only needing to meet the “higher standard.” To meet the “higher standard,” one needs only a second formal argument that generates a safek, even if that formal argument does not affect the overall odds.
In EH 4:17, Rav Moshe presents a third way in which mamzerut differs from ordinary halakhot (at least according to Rambam). In other areas, where there is no specific Biblical leniency for cases of safek, any probability greater than 50% generates a prohibition. However, regarding mamzerut, the Biblical leniency applies to any case where the probability is less than 100%.
Formal rules of halakhah turn majorities into certainties, and so formal rules can create Biblical mamzerut. However, in Rav Moshe’s view, informal/circumstantial evidence and judgments about reality can just about never create a Biblical prohibition. In practice, evidence for mamzerut is generally circumstantial, (e.g. fertilization cannot be witnessed, but only inferred). Therefore, even if we make the Biblical standard “certainty beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather than absolute certainty, Biblical mamzerut will be extremely rare. Rabbinic mamzerut will be much more common – but it can be overcome by a formally distinct second argument that generates some degree of doubt, even if that argument doesn’t change the overall odds.
If we now put it all together, Rav Moshe understands the Talmud to be saying that the Torah is not concerned about children born from adultery or incest marrying in the community; even children who most likely were born from such relationships are perfectly marriageable. The rabbis imposed a higher standard – but that higher standard creates a formal requirement, not a higher statistical bar.
The formal requirement means that every public case of suspected mamzerut requires a formal rabbinic permission. For the process to be taken seriously, both the public and the rabbis must acknowledge that it is possible that no grounds will be found for permission. But every rabbi involved must also understand that in any specific case, not finding such a permission is their failure; there is nothing in the Torah that requires this child to suffer for their parent or parents’ sins.
The result is that Rav Moshe, and any posek following his approach, can with full integrity, and full belief in the Torah as interpreted by the Talmud, seek to resolve every potential case of mamzerut in the direction of leniency. This despite the fact that no one in halakhah has ever suggested that cases of mamzerut never have been and never will be.
Seeking to resolve every case does not mean that one will always succeed. Poskim adopting this approach will properly be held accountable by poskim who adopt other approaches, including those who believe that the goal of halakhah is to prevent people who are factually children of adultery or incest from marry within the community. Leniencies developed without the greatest attention to intellectual rigor will fail in practice.
It should also be clear that Rav Moshe’s position about mamzerut has no necessary implications for any other area of halakhah. What drives Rav Moshe is the conviction that the Torah specifically permits any potential mamzer about whose status there is any doubt at all, and that the Rabbis had no intention or interest in practically expanding the category (at least when doing so would have no significant deterrent effect on adultery – see Part 1). Rav Moshe’s interpretations and rulings result from belief rather than critique.
In Part 3 (LOOK FOR OUR YAMIM NORAIM READER!), I plan to step back from the specific issue of mamzerut and revisit the general question of whether interpretations that make a halakhah wholly impractical are necessarily the result of moral or ethical discomfort.
by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper
Devarim 23:3 bans a mamzer and his or her descendants – even the 10th generation! – from marrying ordinary Jews. Mishnah Yebamot 4:13 records that Rabbi Akiva held that all Biblically forbidden relationships generate mamzerut; Shimon HaAmsuni held that mamzerut results only from relationships (other than niddah) punishable by karet (excision) or worse; and Rabbi Yehoshua held only from those relationships punishable by execution. The law follows the middle position of Shimon HaAmsuni, with the result that mamzerut results only from cases of adultery and incest.
All these Rabbis were fully aware that the law of mamzerut unfairly punishes children for their parents’ sins. Yet we find no record of a position declaring that “there never was and never will be a mamzer.” Why not?
A moral critique of mamzerut is memorably articulated in Vayikra Rabbah (Emor 6) by Daniel the Tailor, who frames it as an interpretation of Kohelet 4:1
ושבתי אני ואראה את כל העשקים אשר נעשים תחת השמש
והנה דמעת העשקים ואין להם מנחם
ומיד עשקיהם כח ואין להם מנחם
I turned, and saw all the oppressions that take place under the sun.
Behold – the tears of the oppressed! and they have no comforter.
Power flows from the hands of their oppressors, and they have no comforter.
ושבתי אני ואראה את כל העשוקים . . .–
דניאל חייטא פתר קרייה בממזרים:
והנה דמעת העשוקים–
אבותם של אלו עוברי עבירות, ואילין עלוביא, מה איכפת להון?!
כך אביו של זה בא על הערוה:
זה מה חטא ומה איכפת לו?!
ואין להם מנחם,אלא מיד עושקיהם כח–
מיד סנהדרי גדולה של ישראל שבאה עליהם מכחה של תורה
ומרחקתן על שום לא יבא ממזר בקהל ה’
ואין להם מנחם
אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא:
לפי שבעוה”ז יש בהן פסולת,
אבל לע”ל אמר זכריה
“אנא חמיתיה אלו כורסוון כולו דהב נקי”
I turned and saw all the oppressions . . .”
Daniel the Tailor interpreted this verse as referring to mamzerim –
Behold – the tears of the oppressed
Their fathers are transgressors, and they suffer: why is it their responsibility? !
So this one’s father commits adultery:
what sin has the son committed, and why is it his responsibility?!
and they have no comforter, rather power flows from the hands of their oppressors–
from the hands of the Great Sanhedrin that comes against them with the force of Torah
and marginalizes them on the basis of the verse “a mamzeir may not enter the Congregation of Hashem”
and they have no comforter
Said the Holy One Blessed Be He:
“It is My responsibility to comfort them,”
for in this world they have in them impurities,
but in the Coming Future the prophet Zechariah said
“I have seen those thrones all of pure gold.”
The Bar Ilan Responsa Project records only one other statement by Daniel the Tailor. In Bereishis Rabbah 64:7, he reads Bereishis 26:14 as teaching that “If a person does not make himself like a slave to his slave, he has not acquired him.” One suspects that this principle was not enforced in rabbinic property courts. It seems safe to categorize Daniel the Tailor as a social critic of halakhah.
Rabbinic literature quotes Daniel’s critiques (albeit not in the Talmuds), without any explicit reservation or controversy. Nevertheless, Professor David Halivni argues that his critique of mamzerut boomeranged. Daniel argued powerfully and memorably that mamzerut was an inherently immoral institution. He thus directly challenged the morality of the Torah. Any subsequent elimination of mamzerut in practice would therefore feel like a confession that the Torah was morally imperfect. That was religiously untenable. So mamzerut continued.
I contend that Professor Halivni overstates the case. It is true that the Talmud records Tannaitic positions that the Rebellious Son, Idolatrous City, and House With Tzora’at never were and never would be. But each of these positions is immediately countered by a statement of certainty (framed as eyewitness testimony) that it had been, and the law does not follow the positions that make these cases impossible. Moreover, the House With Tzora’at is not a moral issue, so it’s not at all clear that those positions were generated by moral discomfort. So mamzerut would have continued anyway.
Moreover, Daniel the Tailor eventually has a profound influence on Halakhah. The sixteenth century Syrian Rabbi Yoshiyahu Pinto (Responsa Nivchar MiKessef 138) cites Daniel as his motivation for seeking to permit a specific mamzer, even while conceding that the mother had committed adultery and emphasizing the severity of that sin. More recently, Rav Ovadiah Yosef zt”l regularly cited Daniel in his responsa permitting alleged mamzerim and mamzerot to marry ordinary Jews (and also in his responsa permitting agunot, a topic requiring separate treatment).
The linchpin for Rav Ovadiah is that G-d says “It is My responsibility to comfort them” against those “that come against them with the force of Torah.” Clearly it would be better not to come against them in the first place, and spare Him the need to comfort them.
The nineteenth century Rabbi Yosef Shaul Nathanson (Responsa Shoeil uMeishiv 1:1:5) read Daniel very differently. He argued that because G-d promised to comfort the victims of His halakhah, we need not worry about creating them. Daniel was not seeking to overturn halakhah on moral grounds, but rather to reconcile halakhic decisors to the pain caused by their decisions.
Rabbi Nathanson’s reading does not seem to fit well with Daniel’s other preserved statement. Perhaps more importantly, Rabbi Nathanson offers his reading in the context of an argument against taking a lenient position in a specific case of adultery before the woman became pregnant. We don’t know whether he would have maintained this attitude when addressing the reality of a potentially unmarriageable child.
I don’t think Rabbi Nathanson would have lacked integrity if he had spent months laboring to permit that child. Because everyone in rabbinic tradition has always understood that mamzerut is morally troubling, because it punishes children for their parents’ sins. Daniel the Tailor is just the best articulation of a universally acknowledged reality. The proper question is and was: Can the good of preventing adultery (or incest) justify that unfairness?
Let’s approach this question via an apparently unrelated suggestion from my teacher Rabbi Aharon Soloveitchik zt”l. Rav Aharon argued that the death penalty in civil society, or Noahide Law, is justified only because it deters other acts of violence. Executions without deterrent impact are just murder. In the United States, he contended, there is no way to carry out the death penalty often enough to accomplish deterrence, without relaxing standards and procedures in ways that will lead to the unjustifiable execution of innocents. Therefore he opposed the death penalty in the U.S.
Rav Aharon’s approach was in principle socially contingent. He did not challenge the morality of the Torah in permitting the death penalty, and he had no need to claim that the death penalty never had been and never would be carried out, or that all past judicial executions had actually been state-licensed murders. There may have been, and may yet be, societies where the proper balance of deterrence and punctiliousness can be maintained. But, he held, the United States in the late twentieth century was not such a society.
One can disagree with Rav Aharon in at least three ways. One can argue that
These grounds for disagreement likely reflect underlying different moral weightings of the different risks. But they enable dialogue and deliberation rather than dismissal or defenestration.
It seems likely that the closest we can come to justifying the status of mamzerut is the claim that it effectively deters adultery. (Granted this doesn’t help us at all regarding mamzerut resulting from incestuous rape.) Otherwise, it is simple cruelty. It therefore becomes necessary to ask whether mamzerut is an effective deterrent in our time and place. I suspect reasonable people can differ about this question, and those differences may reflect the realities of different subcommunities.
What I think we can agree on is that mamzerut should be limited to the minimum number of cases necessary for effective deterrence. Very likely, precisely because mamzerut affects children rather than parents, effective deterrence requires only a barely plausible threat. We also must acknowledge that many American Jews are so far removed from halakhah that there is no possibility that any halakhic outcome could accomplish deterrence. Finally, the reality of effective birth control means that it is difficult for a potential effect on children to deter sexual behavior.
Since there are and probably always will be people who see marriage with factual mamzerim as a threat to the spiritual-genetic quality of the Jewish people, the risk that children will bear the consequences of parents’ sins is always real, and those who can be deterred, will be. Humane poskim therefore can legitimately aim to resolve every case, so long as they can do so with integrity. This was plainly the approach of Rav Ovadiah, and is also the position of the Rav as conveyed to me by Rabbi Abraham Halbfinger of blessed memory.
The rub, of course, is what constitutes integrity. I plan to publish a follow-up essay soon reflecting on, illustrating, and hopefully illuminating that issue.
by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper
The Talmud reports on Tamid 31b-32a that Alexander of Macedon asked the Elders of the Negev ten questions. Among them was אידין מקתרי חכם = who is called wise? They reply:
הרואה את הנולד.
Who is chakham/wise?
The one who sees the nolad.
When Ben Zoma asks the same question rhetorically in Mishnah Avot 2:9, he answers that the wise is “הלומד מכל אדם = the one who learns from all human beings.” Alexander seems to be living out that principle by asking the question here. But why does he receive a different answer? (Or if the Mishnah existed in two alternate versions, what motivates and distinguishes the different answers?)
Mishnaic Hebrew is notoriously unable to keep its tenses straight. Nolad therefore can mean either “that which has been (recently) born,” or else “that which will be born.” Rashi to Tamid 32a defines “the one who sees the nolad” using the latter sense:
המבין מלבו מה שעתיד להיות
קורות שעתידים לבא
one who understands from his own mind what will be in the future
events that in the future will come
and is on guard regarding them
Wisdom, it seems, is the capacity to anticipate, and to act on the basis of current anticipation.
However, Rashi to Devarim 18:13 takes a very different position. The verse is
תמים תהיה עם יקוק אלקיך
You must be tamim with Hashem Your God.
התהלך עמו בתמימות
ותצפה לו ולא תחקור אחר העתידות,
כל מה שיבא עליך – קבל בתמימות
ואז תהיה עמו ולחלקו:
Walk with him in temimut
and be eager for Him, and don’t probe regarding future events
Everything that comes upon you – accept with temimut
then you will be with Him and become His portion
Defining tamim as “having temimut” doesn’t necessarily advance the conversation, but the context suggests a sort of simplicity or even naivete that take life as it comes, without regard for the future. Regardless, the incompatibility is clear. The wise person prepares for the future; the tamim does not.
For Rav Nachman of Bratslav, this might be no contradiction. In his famous story “The Chakham and the Tam,” there is no question that the tam is religiously superior. One might reconcile him with the vast bodies of Jewish literature that idealize the chakham by arguing that the one who “learns from all other human beings” is nonetheless capable of temimut. The one who “understands from his own mind what will be in the future . . . and is on guard regarding them” cannot also be a tam.
One can also explain “who sees the nolad” differently from Rashi. Rabbi Ovadiah miBartenura suggests that such a person understands the ultimate consequences of actions, namely the Heavenly reward or punishment they will yield.
Bartenura is commenting on Mishnah Avot 2:9, which does not mention wisdom explicitly. Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakkai tells his students: “Go out and see what the straight path is that human beings should cleave to.” Rabbis Eliezer, Yehoshua, Yose, and El’azar ben Arakh each offer suggestions modified by the adjective tov: a tov eye, a tov friend, a tov neighbor, a tov heart. Between Rabbi Yose and Rabbi El’azar, Rabbi Shim’on says: “One who sees the nolad.” The literary lack of fit is so stark that some commentaries suggest that Rabbi Shimon was not offering an independent suggestion bur rather defining the “good neighbor” suggested by Rabbi Yose. Meiri even suggests that it defines the good friend, and in the process rules out any reconciliation along the lines of Bratslav.
כמאמר החכם שאמר:
“חברו של אדם שכלו,”
ופעל השכל במדותיו והנהגותיו הוא
שיהא רואה את הנולד בכל דבר שיעשנו,
וטרם עשית הפעולה – יתבונן התכלית הראוי לצאת ממנה.
וכל אשר יעשה כן – לא יחטא
וישלמו ענייניו והנהגותיו על צד [ה]ראוי ושלם.
As in the saying of the chakham who said:
“the friend of a human being is their intellect,”
and the action of the intellect in one’s character and actions is
that one sees the nolad in everything one does,
and before doing an action – meditates on the end-goal that is likely to emerge from it
and anyone who does so – will not sin
and their interests and actions will be shalem in a manner appropriate and shalem.
Meiri attributes the definition to a chakham, which suggests that he sees Rabbi Shimon as defining chokhmah; and he emphasizes the completeness = shleimut of such a person. Onkelos translates tamim in our verse as shalem. So it seems possible that Meiri here is endorsing Onkelos and rejecting Rashi’s understanding of the verse, perhaps because he does not see simplicity/naivete as a religious good.
Tosafot Yom Tov cites Midrash Shmuel as taking issue with Meiri’s moral confidence in his chakham. He notes that when Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai asks the inverse question “Which is the bad path from which a person should distance themselves,” all of Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai’s other students simply reverse their positions, saying ayin ra’ah, shakhen ra, etc. Rabbi Shimon, however, says it refers to one who borrows without repaying. Tosafot Yom Tov argues that this is because seeing the nolad is a good trait, not seeing the nolad is not per se a bad trait. Perhaps carried away by his own argument, he then argues that perhaps seeing the nolad is not a costless good, as it prevents ultimate shleimut.
ובמדרש שמואל כתב בשם הר”י לירמא:
שעם היות שהרואה את הנולד היא דרך טובה,
הבלתי רואה בנולד אינה היא רעה,
לפי שמצינו אנשים הרבה
שעם היות שאינם רואים את הנולד, הם הולכים בדרך ישרה
או האנשים שמקיימים התורה לשם שמים
לא לתקות שום שכר, ולא מפחד שום עונש,
שזאת היא העבודה היותר שלימה שבעבודות,
ולכן לא א”ר שמעון שדרך הרעה היא מי שאינו רואה את הנולד
Midrash Shmuel wrote in the Name of R. Y. Liremma
that while seeing the nolad is a good path,
not seeing the nolad is not a bad thing,
because we have found many people who,
while they do not see the nolad, they walk a straight path,
or people who keep the Torah for the sake of Heaven
and not in the hope of reward, or fear of any punishment,
but rather lishmoh,
because this is the service that is most complete among services,
and therefore Rabbi Shimon did not say
that the way of one who does not see the nolad is a bad one.
Tosafot Yom Tov seems to see even considerations of ultimate consequences as somehow tainting, or in our terms, or as a lack of temimut.
What I hope to have established so far is that the Bratslav story of the chakham and the tam has deep roots. However, the advantage of the tam has been harder to see in our era, when scientific prediction has enabled vast public goods. One can claim that we are at grave risk because we have failed to be full chakhamim, and foreseen only some of the consequences of our actions, but it is hard to sustain a contemporary Jewish claim that we would therefore be better off abandoning the predictive capacities we have gained. We resonate much more with the line of interpretation that sees “be tamim” as preventing us only from seeking knowledge by supernatural means other than Divine prophecy.
This approach fits very well in the context of our verse, which is preceded by a list of occult practitioners whom we are forbidden to consult, and followed by the laws of Divine prophets. All the predictive tools of science are legitimate on this rule. Most of us (I think) also resonate with the Maimonidean claim that all true modes of knowing reality are legitimate, and that the Torah bars only the fruitless seeking of predictive wisdom from frauds.
My question is whether we lose anything by this approach, in terms of either temimut or shleimut, and whether there is any way to get it back. Some theologians Jewish and otherwise have tried to develop a concept of “second naivete” with regard to religious claims about the past; perhaps that can be extended to secular claims about the future. But do we see any virtue in such naivete, or would any such attempt inevitably leave us in the position of a drunken Noah exposed to the jeers of his son and grandson.
Rav Moshe Feinstein’s endorsement of genetic screening for Tay-Sachs (Igrot Mosheh EH 4:10) is an interesting test case. Rav Moshe acknowledges that such testing should be a violation of Rashi’s understanding of Tamim, which he seems to endorse (and lived by, according to the biography at the start of volume 8 of Igrot Moshe). But he cannot tolerate the suffering having Tay-Sachs children causes. So he develops a new distinction.
כיון שעתה נעשה זה באופן קל לבדוק
יש לדון שאם אינו בודק את עצמו –
הוא כסגירת העינים לראות מה שאפשר לראות
Now that it has become easy to check (whether one is a Tay-Sachs carrier),
we can decide that if one does not check themselves
this is like closing the eyes from seeing what it is possible to see.
Virtuous simplicity does not entail walking around blindfolded until one falls into a pit. But how far over the horizon would Rav Mosheh want us to see? Tay-Sachs testing depends on predictions of events many years down the line. Can we still construct a credible and meaningful theory of temimut in the spirit of Rashi? Would we gain something religiously by doing so?